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The United States and England continue to limit the right to trial by jury. Courts
have heavily restricted this right in environmental cost-recovery and contribution actions
– a right that is mandated by the Seventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.2 By
limiting this constitutional right, courts have moved the jury trial – the last vestige of true
democracy – to the outer fringes of the judicial process on the verge of obscurity.
Citizens cannot sit idly by as courts whittle away at this great “bulwark of our liberties” –
the trial by jury.
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Some of the greatest countries in history – Ancient Greece, Ancient Rome,
England and the United States – included the jury trial in the construction of their
democratic structures.4 The strength of these nations and their use of the jury system is
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not coincidental. Jurist from around the world have waxed eloquent in describing the
importance of the jury trial. Sir William Blackstone5 said,
[The jury trial’s] establishment however and use, in this island, of what
date soever [sic] it be, though for a time greatly impaired and shaken by
the introduction of the Norman trial by battel [sic], was always so highly
esteemed and valued by the people, that no conquest, no change of
government, could ever prevail to abolish it.6
Justice Joseph Story7 remarked, “The trial by jury is justly dear to the American people.
It has always been an object of deep interest and solicitude, and every encroachment
upon it has been watched with great jealousy.”8 Alexis de Tocqueville also observed this
romance with the jury system as he considered its importance in both England and
America:
goddess of wisdom is credited with the founding of the jury. MOORE, supra, at 1. However, the dikasteries
appear to be the most tangible record of the earliest jury. Id. The Athenians would select panels of 500
citizens who had taken a solemn oath to judge the law and try facts in trials presided over by a magistrate
who submitted the question at issue before the accused, the accuser, and their witnesses gave statements.
Id. Around 450 B.C., Decemvirs introduced the Romans to the Athenian tradition of jury trials when he
traveled to Athens to investigate the laws of Solon. MOORE, supra, at 2-3. The Roman system was similar
to the Greek system in selection of the members and compensation but differed in the separation of law and
fact, due process requirements, and the jury’s indirect influence on the judgment. LESSER, supra, at 44.
The Romans incorporated the practice of separating questions of law and fact into the Justinian Code. Id.
at 45. The Roman Empire fell removing Roman rule from England and allowing the Celtics and others to
rule various parts until the Anglo-Saxons triumphed wiping out the remnants of the Roman rule. Id. at 59.
The Saxons continued the development of the jury trial. Id. at 74-86. However, in 1066 A.D., William the
Conqueror defeated the Anglo-Saxons, but did not bring radical change to the institution of the jury as the
Saxons did in their triumph. Id. at 89. The reign of William brought with it the foundation of English
common law, which the U.S. adopted to a vast extent in the late eighteenth century. Id. at 87.
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finished his career without accomplishing much in the House of Commons or on the bench. Id. at 60-61.
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distinguished.” Id. at 59. Sir William Blackstone died in 1780 at age 57. Simpson, supra at 60.
6
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND III p. 349 (1768).
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United States Supreme Court. Id. Oliver Wendall Holmes said of Story: “[He has] done more than any
other English-speaking man in this century to make the law luminous and easy to understand.” Id.
8
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I do not know whether the jury is useful to those who are in litigation; but
I am certain it is highly beneficial to those who decide the litigation; and I
look upon it as one of the most efficacious means for the education of
people which society can employ.9
Yet these warm remarks lie in stark contrast to the relentless assault on the storied jury
systems in the United States and England.

10

Jury trials have fallen on hard times.11 Though England will not likely abolish the
jury, English courts have drastically limited their use.12 In contrast, U.S. courts have
13
taken a much more liberal approach in expanding the use of civil juries, but they have

almost uniformly denied the right to trial by jury in contribution and cost-recovery
actions under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act of 1980 (“CERCLA”).14
This Note addresses one main issue: whether or not a right to trial by jury under
CERCLA cost-recovery and contribution actions, and their English counterpart(s), exists.
9
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in England. See also DIPERNA and SWARD and supra text accompanying note 9.
12
S.H. BAILEY et al, SMITH, BAILEY AND GUNN ON THE MODERN ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 1035-1039 (4th
ed. 2002)
13
Montgomery Kersten, Note, Preserving the Right to Jury Trial in Complex Civil Cases, 32 STAN. L.
REV. 99 (1979): “While the Court has extended the seventh amendment into areas it did not cover in 1791,
the Court simply has not indicated a willingness to cut back on its scope.” Id. at 103.
14
See infra text accompanying notes 100-105.
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Past scholarly publications have discussed closely related issues offering helpful legal
analysis, but their historical analysis of cost-recovery and contribution actions is
somewhat abbreviated.15 This Note fills the void providing a much needed, in-depth
historical perspective, for it is the history of environmental laws that ultimately
determines whether or not a Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury attaches.16
Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court has yet to address the issue leaving the law even
more unsettled in an increasingly important area of law.17 The United States and England
continue to conduct jury trials, but their developments of the doctrine greatly contrast.18
Nevertheless, the analysis of the U.S. doctrine depends on the history of English law.
Comparing United States and English law accomplishes two objectives: first, it
reveals the origins of United States’ jury trial doctrine since the United States adopted
English common law doctrine at the time of the drafting of the U.S. Constitution,19 and,
second, it tracks both countries’ use of the jury trial in environmental-response actions.
As the discussion will reveal, the analysis in the United States inevitably requires
understanding of the history of English law, and the discussion of English law provides a
basis to understand America’s adoption of the English theories of law.
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Environmental Law: A Retrospective and Plea for Reinvigoration, 30 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 353
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important field . . .” Id. at 353. See generally Susan Hedman, Expressive Functions of Criminal Sanctions
in Environmental Law, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 889 (1991) (traces the emerging societal importance of
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PATRICK DEVLIN, TRIAL BY JURY 31 (3rd ed. 1966).
19
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jurisprudence.” United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 750 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812).
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Part I will discuss the American response to the issue by exploring the origins of
U.S. environmental law, the purpose of CERCLA, followed by application of canons of
statutory interpretation to germane CERCLA statutes, examining the congressional
record, and analysis of U.S. court decisions. Plaintiffs face a myriad of options through
statutory or common-law actions when pursing recompense for environmental actions,21
but this Note focuses on claims under CERCLA22 and its English counterpart(s).
Specifically, the discussion will focus on sections 107 and 113 of CERCLA.23 Courts
have incorrectly analogized CERCLA actions to restitution actions instead of the proper
eighteenth-century analogs – nuisance or trespass.
Part II discusses the English response to the presented issue by discovering the
origins of the English environmental laws, finding the counterpart to CERCLA costrecovery and contribution actions, and then examining trial by jury in the related English
environmental actions. English common law dating back to before the eighteenth century
provided the theoretical foundation for modern environmental acts. Proper analysis of
these common law actions reveal the correct eighteenth-century analog to U.S.
environmental actions, but this section continues to follow the environmental actions, and
the use of juries in such actions, into the present.
Part III explores the implications of the trial by jury in environmental costrecovery and contribution actions.

Many scholars question the jury system’s

effectiveness in one way or another even though jury trials remain a common thread in
have adopted a jury system at some point in their history, they all have failed to certain degrees and several
of these countries have replaced the jury with a “lay assessors” system, quite different from the jury system.
Id. However, the jury has survived in Scotland and continues to thrive in Ireland where many civil trials go
before juries. Id. Even during the height of the use of juries, only a handful of countries retained the
system and no continental country introduced the jury into their judicial system. Id.
21
Plaintiffs may choose between common law nuisance or trespass claims or they may bring actions based
in statutory law such as CERCLA. Infra text accompanying notes 29-45.
22
Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601- 9675 as amended)
23
42 U.S.C. §§ 9607, 9613.
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the legal fabric of the American and English legal systems.24 The focus of the criticism
attempts to explain that juries can no longer handle the now increasingly difficult task of
25
sifting through esoteric legal terms and complex legal theories. Critics argue theories of

efficiency plead for a trial by a judge rather than a jury of peers.26 However, courts can
easily mitigate or eliminate these concerns.

I. THE UNITED STATES
A Brief History of U.S. Environmental Laws

Modern environmental law began to develop during the post-World War II
27
decades of the 1950’s and 1960’s, but common law actions, providing avenues of relief

for environmental harm, existed before then.

Common law actions, such as public

nuisance and trespass claims inherited from the English courts of law, created the basis
for legislative act that in turn laid the foundation for CERCLA
. 28
The United States recognized the law of nuisance in the eighteenth century as an
action in courts of law or equity29 with nuisance law being a vehicle for recovery in

24

Jackson, supra note 11, at 132.
Douglas G. Smith, Structural and Functional Aspects of the Jury: Comparative Analysis and Proposals
for Reform, 48 ALA. L. REV. 441, 444 n.5 (1997)
26
Id.
27
MATTHEW BENDER, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 1.01 (2002). For an insightful study on the
development of natural resources environmental law in the U.S., see Jan G. Laitos, Legal Institutions and
Pollution: Some Intersections Between Law and History, 15 NAT. RESOURCES J. 423 (1975).
28
G. Nelson Smith, III, Nuisance and Trespass Claims in Environmental Litigation: Legislative Inaction
and Common Law Confusion, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 39 (1995).
29
William Draper Lewis, Injunctions Against Nuisances and the Rule Requiring the Plaintiff to Establish
His Right at Law, 56 U. PA. L. REV. 289 (1908); Note, Trial by Jury in Suits to Enjoin Nuisances, 25
COLUM. L.REV. 641 (1925); Burrows v. Pixley, 1 Root 362 (Conn. 1792) (a nuisance action lies when
someone alters a navigable waterway to the detriment of another); Nichols v. Pixly, 1 Root 129 (Conn.
1789) (no action for nuisance lies if a person constructing a dam received a license to do so). Early
recognition by the States of Sir William Blackstone’s sic utere tuo rule (“causing injury to someone’s
enjoyment of property creates a cause for recovery”) can be found in Hay v. Cohoes Co., 2 N.Y. 159 (N.Y.
1849) (property owners have a right to construct a canal on their property, but they are not allowed to blast
rocks onto neighboring land). H. Marlow Green, Common Law, Property Rights and the Environment: A
25
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environmental claims.30 Courts defined public nuisance as “a wrong affecting an interest
‘common to the general public, rather than to one peculiar individual or several.’”

31

These early cases typically involved pollution of a water source,32 blasting of rocks onto
property,33 or other general violations of a citizen’s right to the natural use and enjoyment
of his own property.34 Nuisance claims sounded in law when claimants pursued monetary
damages and in equity when they pursued injunctive relief.35
Similarly, plaintiffs brought trespass actions to recoup damages to land, an action
distinct from nuisance. An action in trespass allowed landowners to recover for invasions
which interfered with their right of exclusive possession of the land as a direct result from
the acts of the defendant.36
enjoyment.37

Nuisance involves merely interference with use and

Early cases in American history dealt with infringement caused by

misplaced water flow,38 damming of water,39 and other forms of launching materials onto

Comparative Analysis of Historical Developments in the United States and England and a Model for the
Future, 30 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 541, 546-554 (1997).
30
Susan Verdicchio, Environmental Restoration Orders, 12 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 171, 188 (1985);
“The deepest doctrinal roots of modern environmental law are found in principles of nuisance. . . .
Nuisance theory and case law is the common law backbone of modern environmental and energy law.”
WARREN FREEDMAN, HAZARDOUS WASTE LIABILITY 120-121 (1992).
31
L. Mark Walker & Dale E. Cottingham, An Abridged Primer on the Law of Public Nuisance, 30 TULSA
L. J. 355, 357 (1994) citing WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 88, at 585 (4th ed.
1971).
32
Walker, supra note 31, at 358.
33
Green, supra note 29, at 548.
34
Id.
35
N.A.A.C.P. v. A.A. Arms, Inc., 2003 WL 1049011 (E.D. N.Y. 2003):
It is well settled that nuisance claims seeking solely injunctive relief are equitable in
nature. Cases and authorities cited by the defendant for the proposition that nuisance
claims are historically legal are nuisance claims where money damages were sought in
addition to injunctive relief or cases where the legal issue presented was not in actuality
one of public nuisance. Plaintiff does not seek damages, but exclusively equitable relief.
Id. at 5 (citations omitted). See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 220-22
(1765-69).
36
WILLIAM L. PROSSER & W. PAGE KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS 67 (5th ed. 1984).
37
Id. at 70.
38
Id. at 69.
39
Id.
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the land of another,40 but later cases showed a trend towards allowing suit for
environmental damages such as pollution caused by asphalt poisoning a pond

41

or

projection of chemical compounds in gaseous or particulate form onto neighboring land.42
The line separating nuisance actions from trespass actions when dealing with invisible
gas or microscopic particles has become quite blurred.43 Nevertheless, the truth remains
that the common law ancestors of nuisance and trespass law produced the theoretical
framework for modern environmental law.44
When common law actions failed to produce a solution to the growing problem of
45

pollution, statutes such as CERCLA preempted nuisance and trespass actions.

The

movement in the post-World War II era sprang from two separate purposes and groups:
first, to conserve the creation around us and preserve it for posterity and, second, to
protect the humans.46

The first group began with the likes of President Theodore

Roosevelt who sought to conserve the quality of life, natural resources, and the

40

Id. at 68.
Id. at 71.
42
PROSSER, supra note 36,at 71.
43
Id.
44
Smith, supra note 2, at 40: “Ironically, while the [current environmental law] statutes themselves are
relatively new, they are based in the common law remedies of nuisance and trespass.”
45
Verdicchio, supra note 30, at 183: “Before the enactment of state and federal environmental protection
legislation, common law actions were the only vehicles for advancing environmental claims. Indeed, one
of the reasons for enacting environmental laws was because private litigation was inadequate to protect the
public interest inherent in natural resources.” Id. However, the actions of nuisance and trespass to land
still may be used by plaintiffs in environmental damages cases. See Smith, III, supra note 28. There
appears to be some dispute as to whether federal common law of nuisance exists. “In addition, even if this
were an appropriate area for federal common law, any such common law has been preempted by the
enactment of the RCRA and, more recently, [CERCLA].” U.S. v. Price, 523 F.Supp. 1055, 1069 (D.C.
N.J., 1981), aff’d 688 F.2d 204 (3rd Cir. 1982). The court in U.S. v. Argent Corp., 1983 WL 354 (D.N.M.
1983) held CERCLA did not preempt federal common law claims of nuisance because there was simply no
federal common law nuisance theories. Id. However, that court failed to take notice of Georgia v.
Tennessee Copper Co., 205 U.S. 230 (1907), where the U.S. Supreme Court applied federal common law
nuisance to a dispute between neighboring states. Id. See also Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906).
Furthermore, the Court in Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) recognized “new federal laws and
new federal regulations may in time pre-empt the field of common law of nuisance” in holding that the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 pre-empted the federal common law of
nuisance. Id. at 314.
46
BENDER, supra note 27, § 1.01.
41
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outdoors.47 The second group primarily acted in the interests of public health.48 The
public became acutely aware of the risks involved in environmental harm as pollution of
water sources, air pollution, and major oil spills began to raise public health concerns.

49

Necessity being the mother of invention, the legislature responded to the need for federal
pollution control and enacted legislation beginning in 1956.50

A plethora of

environmental acts were passed during the 1960’s and 1970’s that covered solid waste,51
air pollution,52 toxic waste,53 water pollution,54 and established the Environmental
Protection Agency (“EPA”).55 Then CERCLA arrived.
The purpose of CERCLA is quite clear: persons or entities that cause damage by
releasing hazardous substances will pay for the clean up.

56

In expanding upon this view,

courts have also interpreted the purpose:
[T]o encourage maximum care and responsibility in the handling of
hazardous waste; to provide for rapid response to environmental
emergencies; to encourage voluntary clean-up of hazardous waste spills;
to encourage early reporting of violations of the statute; and to ensure that
parties responsible for release of hazardous substances bear the costs of
response and costs of damage to natural resources.57

47

Id. Bender refers to this camp as the “high-road environmentalists.” Id.
Id. Conversely, this camp was known as the “low-road environmentalists.” Id.
49
Id.
50
BENDER, supra note 27, § 1.01.
51
42 U.S.C. § 6901-6991 (Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965).
52
42 U.S.C. § 7401 et. seq (Clean Air Act revision in 1977).
53
15 U.S.C. § 2622 (Toxic Substance Control Act of 1976).
54
33 U.S.C. § 1367 (Clean Water Act revision of 1977).
55
The EPA was established by President Richard M. Nixon in July of 1970 to consolidate the powers of the
executive branch in regulation of environmental issues. See Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970 at
http://www.epa.gov/history/org/origins/reorg.htm (last visited November 15, 2003).
56
FREEDMAN, supra note 30, at 212-213; Lewis M. Barr, CERCLA Made Simple: An Analysis of the Cases
Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 45 BUS.
LAW. 923, 924-925 (1990).
57
Barr, supra note 56, at 924 (citing Chemical Waste Management v. Armstrong World Indus., 669
F.Supp. 1285, 1290 n.6 (E.D. Pa. 1987)). See also FREEDMAN supra note 30, at 120-121.
48
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The Clean Air Act,58 the Clean Water Act (“CWA”),59 the Toxic Substances Control Act,60
and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act61 designate toxic or hazardous
substances, yet CERCLA has now become the “primary mechanism for governmental
response actions” by offering a more comprehensive statutory coverage thereby eclipsing
the other acts and other regulatory schemes.62
Due to the difficulty of CERCLA’s statutory language and the amount of
evidence found in many of the CERCLA law suits, CERCLA actions have not only
earned the label as complex litigation but also as some of the most complex cases brought
in federal court.63 Most plaintiffs name multiple potentially responsible parties (“PRP”)
in search of one party to be jointly and severally liable creating complex procedures for
parties to navigate.64

As parties step through the procedures in complex CERCLA

litigation, they face the decision of trial by jury.

Statutory Analysis of CERCLA Sections 107 and 113

Two possible avenues for a right to trial by jury in the United States exist: either
(1) the statutory basis of the claim explicitly announces a right to a jury trial, or (2) the
guarantee of a right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
attaches because of the legal nature of the action and remedies.65 “If Congress has

58

42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376
60
15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629
61
42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987
62
FREEDMAN, supra note 30, at 222-225.
63
DAVID F. HERR, ANN. MANUEL COMPLEX LIT. 21.422 (3rd ed.).
64
Elbaum, supra note 15, at 358.
65
Morgan v. Ameritech, 26 F.Supp.2d 1087, 1090-91 (C.D. Ill. 1998) citing Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S.
189 (1974). “A right to trial by jury may arise either by statute or via the Seventh Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution.” Id. at 191-192 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). Pandazides v. Virginia Bd. of
Educ., 13 F.3d 823 (4th Cir. 1994). “The Seventh Amendment thus requires a jury trial upon demand if the
59
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provided for the right to trial by jury in a statute, there is no need to examine the
constitutional issue.”66
When interpreting statutes, the elementary rule is to first look at the plain
language of the statute.67 If the plain reading of the statute provides the clear answer to
the question presented, the inquiry ends.68 However, ambiguities often exist causing a
controversy to be resolved by the courts.69 Nevertheless, legislatures do not enact statutes
within a vacuum.70 Practitioners and judges alike have multiple resources, such as the
congressional record, at their disposal to investigate the ambiguities and determine the
true intent of the legislature.71 These resources will be utilized in order to determine
whether Congress, indeed, intended for a jury trial to attach.
Two provisions within CERCLA provide plaintiffs with the ability to recover
expenses related to the clean up of hazardous waste. The first provision – section 9607
(also known as “CERCLA section 107”) – specifically outlines who is liable for which
actions.72 The second provision – section 9613 (also known as “CERCLA section 113”)

statute creates legal rights and remedies that are ‘enforceable in an action for damages in the ordinary
courts of law.’” Id. at 828.
66
Morgan, 26 F.Supp.2d at 1090-1091. Kobs v. Arrow Service Bureau, Inc., 134 F.3d 893 (7th Cir. 1998):
[T]here are two possible sources of a right of trial by jury for a statutory cause of action.
Congress may provide for trial by jury in the statute that creates the claim regardless of
whether the claim involves rights and remedies of the type traditionally enforced in a
court of law before a jury. Alternatively, if the claim involves rights and remedies of the
type traditionally enforced in an action at law, the Seventh Amendment requires that the
right of jury trial be preserved.
Id. at 896.
67
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917). “It is elementary that the meaning of a statute must, in
the first instance, be sought in the language in which the act is framed.” Id. at 485. ABNER J. MIKVA &
ERIC LANE, AN INTRODUCTION TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 9-16
(1997); NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45.01 (4th ed. 1984).
68
MIKVA et al, supra note 67, at 9-16. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (1984). “Where . . . the resolution of
a question of federal law turns on a statute and the intention of Congress, we look first to the statutory
language and then to the legislative history if the statutory language is unclear.” Id. at 896.
69
U.S. v. Quarrell, 310 F.3d 664, 669 (10th Cir. 2002).
70
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 313 (2001).
71
Shallus v. U.S., 162 F. 653 (4th Cir. 1908). “[T]o ascertain [the purpose of Congress] we are entitled to
consider its records and debates upon the subject . . .” Id. at 656.
72
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a):
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– allows plaintiffs to seek contribution from the liable parties.73 The statutory language in
CERCLA, including sections 107 and 113, fails to explicitly address whether Congress
granted a jury trial.

74

However, statutory analysis does not end there because legislative

history may provide further insight into whether Congress intended a right to a jury trial.75

Covered persons; scope; recoverable costs and damages; interest rate; “comparable
maturity” date Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to the
defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section--(1) the owner and operator of a vessel
or a facility, (2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance
owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,(3)
any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment,
or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous
substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at any
facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and containing
such hazardous substances, and(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous
substances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites
selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a threatened release which
causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be liable for--(A)
all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Government or a
State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the national contingency plan;(B) any other
necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent with the national
contingency plan;(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources,
including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss resulting
from such a release; and(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study
carried out under section 9604(i) of this title.
Id. (emphasis added).
73
42 U.S.C. § 9613(f):
(1) Contribution
Any person may seek contribution from any other person who is liable or potentially
liable under section 9607(a) of this title, during or following any civil action under
section 9606 of this title or under section 9607(a) of this title. Such claims shall be
brought in accordance with this section and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and
shall be governed by Federal law. In resolving contribution claims, the court may allocate
response costs among liable parties using such equitable factors as the court determines
are appropriate. Nothing in this subsection shall diminish the right of any person to bring
an action for contribution in the absence of a civil action under section 9606 of this title
or section 9607 of this title.
Id. (emphasis supplied). For additional discussion on the nexus between §§ 107 and 113, see William D.
Araiza, Text, Purpose, and Facts: The Relationship Between CERCLA Sections 107 and 113, 72 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 193 (1996).
74
CERCLA §§ 107 & 113, supra notes 72 & 73. American Cyanamid Co. v. King Industries, Inc., 814
F.Supp. 209 (D.R.I. 1993). “The statute does not expressly state whether an action under § 113(f)(1) is to
be tried before a jury.” Id. at 212.
75
Waldrop v. Southern Co. Services, Inc., 24 F.3d 152 (11th Cir. 1994). “If the statute and its legislative
history are silent regarding the right to a jury trial, then we must ask whether a jury trial is constitutionally
required under the Seventh Amendment.” Id. at 155. American Cyanamid Co., 814 F.Supp. at 212. “That
the statute does not expressly provide for jury trials does not end the matter. Legislative intent, if
discernible, must be consulted.” Id. (citations omitted).
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CERCLA has a reputation not only for its comprehensive approach to
environmental response, but also for its inept drafting.

The U.S. Supreme Court has

berated CERCLA’s language as “poorly drafted, hastily considered, and bereft of a useful
legislative history.”76 Even the legislators themselves conceded CERCLA leaves much to
be desired.77 CERCLA is far from “a model of legislative draftsmanship.”78 Vague
provisions, indefinite or contradictory legislative history, lack of legislative history for
certain provisions and lack of committee or conference reports plague the CERCLA
sections of code.79
Notwithstanding these shortcomings, courts believe Congress made the general
purpose of CERCLA quite clear.80

Congress amended CERCLA in 1986 with the

Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (“SARA”).81

With the SARA

amendment, Congress added section 113 to CERCLA, which did not exist in the original
CERCLA provisions.82 By enacting SARA, Congress sought to fill the holes in CERCLA

76

FREEDMAN, supra note 30, at 212 n.355 (citing Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989)).
Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability (“Superfund”) Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 34 (1982)
78
Exxon v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 363 (1986); ALFRED R. LIGHT, CERCLA LAW AND PROCEDURE
COMPENDIUM I-1 (1992).
79
LIGHT, supra note 78, at I-1. See also Beverly Z. Alexander, CERCLA 1980-1985: A Research Guide,
13 ECOLOGY L. Q. 311, 312 (1986).
80
Chemical Waste Management v. Armstrong World Indus., 669 F.Supp. at 1290 n.6 (1987).
81
American Cyanamid Co., 814 F.Supp. at 212. “Section 113(f)(1) was added to CERCLA by the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986)
(“SARA”), and codified a right to contribution which had already been implied by numerous courts under
federal common law.” Id. For discussion on CERCLA § 9607, see also California Dept. of Toxic
Substances Control v. Alco Pacific, Inc., 217 F.Supp. 1028 (C.D. Cal. 2002); U.S. v. Lang, 870 F.Supp.
722 (E.D. Tex. 1994); Hatco Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 859 F.Supp. 769 (D. N.J. 1994), aff’d 59 F.3d
400 (3rd Cir. 1995) reh’g and reh’g en banc denied; Town of Jaffrey v. Town of Fitzwilliam, 846 F.Supp.
3 (D. N.H. 1994); American Cyanamid Co. v. King Industries, Inc., 814 F.Supp. 209 (D. R.I. 1993); U.S. v.
Northernaire Plating Co., 685 F.Supp. 1410 (W.D. Mich. 1988), aff’d on other grounds 889 F.2d 1497 (6th
Cir. 1989), cert. denied 494 U.S. 1057 (1990); U.S. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., Inc.,
810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, cert. denied 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
82
American Cyanamid Co., 814 F.Supp. at 212.
77
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and provide a more adequate legislative history.83 However, neither the legislative history
84

of CERCLA nor its SARA amendment explicitly addresses the right to trial by jury.

Seventh Amendment Analysis

Since the plain language of CERCLA and legislative history fail to explicitly
address the issue of jury trials, courts have invoked their right to interpret the statute
under a Seventh Amendment analysis.85 This section discusses the Seventh Amendment
analysis used by U.S. courts and then examines how the courts have applied the analysis
to CERCLA cost-recovery and contribution actions.
The Seventh Amendment provides:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact
tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United
86
States, than according to the rules of the common law.
The ambiguity surrounding the issue arises from the phrase “Suits at common law.” In
determining whether suits fall under the purviews of “Suits at common law,” the U.S.
Supreme Court in Tull v. United States87 laid out the two-prong Seventh Amendment
analysis: (1) the court must first compare the statutory action to similar actions brought in
eighteenth-century English courts prior to the merger of law and equity,88 and (2) the

83

LIGHT, supra note 78, at I-2.
American Cyanamid Co., 669 F.Supp. at 212-13.
85
California Dept. of Toxic Substances Control v. Alco Pacific, Inc., 217 F.Supp. 1028 (C.D. Cal. 2002);
U.S. v. Lang, 870 F.Supp. 722 (E.D. Tex. 1994); Hatco Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 859 F.Supp. 769 (D.
N.J. 1994), aff’d 59 F.3d 400 (3rd Cir. 1995) reh’g and reh’g en banc denied; Town of Jaffrey v. Town of
Fitzwilliam, 846 F.Supp. 3 (D. N.H. 1994); American Cyanamid Co. v. King Industries, Inc., 814 F.Supp.
209 (D. R.I. 1993); U.S. v. Northernaire Plating Co., 685 F.Supp. 1410 (W.D. Mich. 1988), aff’d on other
grounds 889 F.2d 1497 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied 494 U.S. 1057 (1990); U.S. v. Northeastern
Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., Inc., 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, cert.
denied 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
86
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
87
481 U.S. 412 (1987).
88
Id. at 417-18.
84
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court must examine the remedy sought to determine whether or not it sounds in law or
equity.89 At common law, courts of law granted jury trials to claims brought in their
courts while courts of equity generally denied the right to a jury trial.90 Under the current
Seventh Amendment doctrine, when parties present both equitable and legal issues in one
case, courts will recognize the right to a jury trial.91 Therefore the action must be
considered purely equitable for courts to deny the right to trial by jury under the Seventh
Amendment analysis.92
Scholars and courts alike have criticized the first prong of the analysis because of
its requirement to search the tomes of history. Many courts, including the U.S. Supreme
Court, appear to discount the importance of viewing the action and remedy before them
in light of eighteenth-century (or earlier) law and procedure.

93

The search into the

historical developments of the courts for the closest analog to the present day case may
appear “abstruse”94 or “quite rare,”95 but the Court always conducts the historical search.96
At the conclusion of the search, the Court uses its findings as the basis for its decision in
Seventh Amendment cases.97 The Court ultimately attempts to find an analogous claim at

89

Id.
PROFFATT, supra note 4, at 129.
91
Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
92
Marozan v. U.S., 90 F.3d 1284, 1291 (7th Cir. 1996) (“no right to a jury trial on purely equitable
issues”); Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778, 784 (9th Cir. 1979); Whiting v. Jackson State University, 616
F.2d 116, 123 n.3 (5th Cir. 1980); U.S. v. Articles of Drug Consisting of Following: 5,609 Boxes, 745 F.2d
105, 112 (1st Cir. 1984); Skippy, Inc. v. CPC Intern., Inc., 674 F.2d 209, 215 (4th Cir. 1982); Klein v. Shell
Oil Co., 386 F.2d 659, 663 (8th Cir. 1967).
93
Tull, 481 U.S. at 421; Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1979).
94
Tull, 481 U.S. at 421.
95
Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 225 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissent).
96
Great-West, 534 U.S. at 217. The historical analysis of the law-equity dichotomy will always be pursued
by the Court in Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury cases. Id.
97
Tull, 481 U.S. at 412; Great-West, 534 U.S. at 225.
90
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common law where the action and the remedy correlate to the present action.98 However,
the Court has considered the second prong of the Tull analysis more important.

99

Even though multiple federal courts have denied the right to trial by jury in
CERCLA cost-recovery actions,100 courts have acknowledged that parties can make a
good argument for a right to a jury trial,101 and the argument has been persuasive.102 In
denying the right to a jury trial, the courts have simply stated that the claims are equitable
in nature and therefore are not guaranteed the right to a jury trial under the Seventh
Amendment.103

The syllogism used by these courts is as follows: the Seventh

Amendment right does not attach to purely equitable claims; CERCLA cost-recovery and
contribution actions are analogous to purely equitable restitution claims; therefore,
CERCLA cost-recovery and contribution actions are equitable in nature without a right to
104

trial by jury.

This widely adopted analysis appears, on the surface, pellucid, but

fundamental flaws exist.
First of all, courts should not analogize CERCLA cost-recovery actions to
restitution actions. CERCLA cost-recovery actions are statutory actions,

105

and restitution

98

Tull, 481 U.S. at 421 n.6.
Tull, 481 U.S. at 421.
100
California Dept. of Toxic Substances Control v. Alco Pacific, Inc., 217 F.Supp. 1028 (C.D. Cal. 2002);
U.S. v. Lang, 870 F.Supp. 722 (E.D. Tex. 1994); Hatco Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 859 F.Supp. 769 (D.
N.J. 1994), aff’d 59 F.3d 400 (3rd Cir. 1995) reh’g and reh’g en banc denied; Town of Jaffrey v. Town of
Fitzwilliam, 846 F.Supp. 3 (D. N.H. 1994); American Cyanamid Co. v. King Industries, Inc., 814 F.Supp.
209 (D. R.I. 1993); U.S. v. Northernaire Plating Co., 685 F.Supp. 1410 (W.D. Mich. 1988), aff’d on other
grounds 889 F.2d 1497 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied 494 U.S. 1057 (1990); U.S. v. Northeastern
Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., Inc., 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, cert.
denied 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
101
G.L. Industries of Michigan, Inc. v. Forstmann-Little, 800 F.Supp. 695, 699 (S.D. Ind. 1991).
102
New York v. Lashins Arcade Co., 881 F.Supp. 101 (1995) aff’d, 91 F.3d 353 (2nd Cir. 1996). However,
in affirming on other grounds, the Second Circuit footnoted their criticism of the District Court’s
recognition of a right to trial by jury under CERCLA § 107. Lashins, 91 F.3d at 362 n.7.
103
Northeastern, 810 F.2d at 726.
104
Hatco, 59 F.3d at 411-414.; Northeastern, 810 F.2d at 749.
105
International Clinical Laboratories, Inc. v. Stevens, 710 F.Supp. 466, 470 (E.D. N.Y. 1989) citing
Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 600 F.Supp. 1049, 1055 (D.C. Ariz. 1984): “Mardan's lawsuit is
based not upon warranty theory but rather upon the statutory cause of action created by Section 107(a) of
CERCLA.” See also FREEDMAN, supra note 56, at 329-332; but cf,. Trimble v. ASARCO, Inc., 83 F.Supp.
99
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actions are common-law, quasi-contract actions, not statutory.106 A statutory cause of
action exists when a party violates the clear language of a constitutional provision, statute
or regulation,

107

and CERCLA clearly provides a cost recovery action in section 107.108

Both common-law tort actions and statutory actions stem from the same vein with the
fundamental difference being that statutes create the legal duty,109 and statutes such as
CERCLA impose strict liability.110

The U.S. Supreme Court in Great-West Life &

Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson111 stated,
Almost invariably . . . suits seeking (whether by judgment, injunction, or
declaration) to compel the defendant to pay a sum of money to the
plaintiff are suits for ‘money damages,’ as that phrase has traditionally
been applied, since they seek no more than compensation for loss resulting
from the defendant’s breach of legal duty.’ And ‘[m]oney damages are, of
course, the classic form of legal relief.112
When parties breach their duty imposed by CERCLA and related regulations
promulgated by the EPA, plaintiffs may seek money damages, a legal relief, in a costrecovery or contribution action.113 For courts to analogize CERCLA cost-recovery and

2d 1034, 1039 (D. Neb. 1999) (held no statutory cause of action under CERCLA §§ 107 and 113 for
private property owners); Waste, Inc. Remedial Design/Remedial Action Group v. Cohn, 60 F.Supp. 2d
833 (N.D. Ind. 1997) (standing for the proposition that citizens, as opposed to government entities, do not
have a statutory cause of action under CERCLA §§ 107 or 113).
106
GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 4 & 6 (1978) (the law of restitution developed from a
quasi-contract theory and quasi-contract theory originates in early English common law); U.S. v. P/B
STCO 213, ON 527 979, 756 F.2d 364, 375 n.14 (5th Cir. 1985); Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v. Superior
Court of Del. In and For New Castle County, 366 U.S. 656, 663 (1961) (restitution claims are common law
claims that do not fall under federal statutory law).
107
Griggs v. Coca-Cola Employee’s Credit Union, 909 F.Supp. 1066, 1069 (E.D. Tenn. 1995).
108
See supra text accompanying note 72.
109
Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. at 195 (1974) (“A damages action under the statute sounds basically in tort-the statute merely defines a new legal duty, and authorizes the courts to compensate a plaintiff for the
injury caused by the defendant's wrongful breach”); Board of Trustees of University of Alabama v.
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 375 (2001); Carter v. U.S., 333 F.3d 791, 797 (7th Cir. 2003) (“An injury resulting
from the violation of a statute (or other source of a legal duty, such as the regulation concerning treatment
options on which the plaintiff relies) is actionable under tort law only if the statute was intended to avert the
kind of injury that occurred”).
110
New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d. 1032 (2nd Cir. 1985). It is well settled law that CERCLA §
107 imposes a strict liability standard on defendants. Id. at 1043-44; FREEDMAN, supra note 30, at 219.
111
534 U.S. 204 (2002).
112
534 U.S. at 210 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
113
Id.
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contribution actions to restitution shows they accept the flawed premise that common-law
actions and statutory actions are identical in nature when in fact they are quite different.114
Courts should instead analogize CERCLA cost-recovery actions to common law nuisance
or trespass claims – the predecessor actions of CERCLA.
Second, CERCLA cost recovery actions are not purely equitable in nature because
the statutory language fails to focus on pure restitution. As seen from a plain reading of
the language in CERCLA sections 107 and 113, plaintiffs may seek remedies aside from
restitution.115 CERCLA section 107 provides for compensation for damage to natural
116

resources which sounds in tort or trespass and not restitution.

It is well-settled law that

tort and trespass actions sound in law and not equity.117 Since parties liable under section
107 may fall within section 113,118 courts may reasonably infer the same focus of
restitution and natural resource damage applies to section 113.119

The courts, as

previously mentioned, have held the Seventh Amendment protection fails only if the
action is purely equitable in nature.120 Since CERCLA cost-recovery actions are not
purely equitable restitution actions and contain certain legal aspects, the Seventh
Amendment should preserve the right to trial by jury.

114

Infra note 188. The crucial difference between suits at law and equity pivots on how they entered the
judicial system. Suits at law found their bases in writs or statutes and suits at equity did not require such
bases.
115
New York v. Lashins Arcade Co., 881 F.Supp. 101 (S.D. N.Y. 1995).
116
Lashins, 881 F.Supp. at 104 (1995): “A plain reading of CERCLA reveals that pure equitable restitution
of money is not the focus of Section 107.”
117
Id.
118
42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) supra note 73.
119
Hatco v. W.R. Grace & Co., 59 F.3d 400 (3rd Cir. 1995). Courts have recognized the nexus between
section 107 and 113.
120
Marozan v. U.S., 90 F.3d 1284, 1291 (7th Cir. 1996) (“no right to a jury trial on purely equitable
issues”); Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778, 784 (9th Cir. 1979); Whiting v. Jackson State University, 616
F.2d 116, 123 n.3 (5th Cir. 1980); U.S. v. Articles of Drug Consisting of Following: 5,609 Boxes, 745 F.2d
105, 112 (1st Cir. 1984); Skippy, Inc. v. CPC Intern., Inc., 674 F.2d 209, 215 (4th Cir. 1982); Klein v. Shell
Oil Co., 386 F.2d 659, 663 (8th Cir. 1967). See supra text accompanying notes 91 & 92 and Dairy Queen,
Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. at 472-73.
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Even though the Court has considered restitution actions purely equitable in the
past,121 the pendulum has swung as the Court now recognizes restitution as a claim with at
least a hybrid nature.122 The U.S. Supreme Court has most recently held in Great-West
that restitution sounds in both law and equity. “Thus, ‘restitution is a legal remedy when
ordered in a case at law and an equitable remedy . . . when ordered in an equity case,’ and
whether it is legal or equitable depends on ‘the basis for [the plaintiff’s] claim’ and the
nature of the underlying remedies sought.”

123

The Court embraced the analysis of Reich

v. Continental Casualty Co.124 in reaching its conclusion that restitution is equitable in an
equity case and legal when used in a case at law.

125

This conclusion effectively elevates

the first prong of Tull.
Third, the purpose of CERCLA – in addition to providing cost recovery – is to
penalize.126 If a site is determined to be in need of environmental cleanup, CERCLA
section 104127 has given government agencies several courses of action to accomplish the

121

City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 710, (1999).
Great-West, 534 U.S. at 213-14.
123
Id. The Court also said, “However, not all relief falling under the rubric of restitution is available in
equity.” Id. at 212.
124
33 F.3d 754 (7th Cir. 1994).
125
Great-West, 534 U.S. at 213; infra note 188.
126
Compare CERCLA § 107, supra note 72, and CERCLA § 104, infra note 127.
127
42 U.S.C. § 9604:
(a) Removal and other remedial action by President; applicability of national
contingency plan; response by potentially responsible parties; public health threats;
limitations on response; exception:
(1) Whenever (A) any hazardous substance is released or there is a substantial threat of
such a release into the environment, or (B) there is a release or substantial threat of
release into the environment of any pollutant or contaminant which may present an
imminent and substantial danger to the public health or welfare, the President is
authorized to act, consistent with the national contingency plan, to remove or arrange for
the removal of, and provide for remedial action relating to such hazardous substance,
pollutant, or contaminant at any time (including its removal from any contaminated
natural resource), or take any other response measure consistent with the national
contingency plan which the President deems necessary to protect the public health or
welfare or the environment. When the President determines that such action will be done
properly and promptly by the owner or operator of the facility or vessel or by any other
responsible party, the President may allow such person to carry out the action, conduct
the remedial investigation, or conduct the feasibility study in accordance with section
122
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task. First, government agencies may order a party to “abate such a danger or threat” by
issuing an administrative order.128 Second, the agency may also seek injunctive relief in
federal district court ordering the responsible party to clean up the site.129 Finally, as
previously discussed, the agency may itself abate the potential danger by cleaning up the
site, and then, under section 107, bring suit against the PRP to recover the costs
incurred.130 If the PRP fails to comply with the administrative order or the injunctive
relief granted by the court, the PRP could be held liable under section 107 and also may
incur penalties under section 9606.131 The penalties under section 9606 are substantial, as
the fines can be up to $25,000 per day and treble damages.

132

The fact that CERCLA includes not only a basis for recovery of damages in
connection to environmental harm, but also penalties if a defendant breaches a duty,
communicates an intention by Congress to penalize offenders.

The Court in Tull

recognized penalties under the CWA as legal in nature.133 This connection between the
penalties in section 106 of CERCLA and the cost-recovery action in section 107 allows
plaintiffs to bring both actions in tandem creating a mixture of an obvious legal action

9622 of this title. No remedial investigation or feasibility study (RI/FS) shall be
authorized except on a determination by the President that the party is qualified to
conduct the RI/FS and only if the President contracts with or arranges for a qualified
person to assist the President in overseeing and reviewing the conduct of such RI/FS and
if the responsible party agrees to reimburse the Fund for any cost incurred by the
President under, or in connection with, the oversight contract or arrangement. In no event
shall a potentially responsible party be subject to a lesser standard of liability, receive
preferential treatment, or in any other way, whether direct or indirect, benefit from any
such arrangements as a response action contractor, or as a person hired or retained by
such a response action contractor, with respect to the release or facility in question. The
President shall give primary attention to those releases which the President deems may
present a public health threat.
Id.
128

42 U.S.C. § 9606(a).
Id.; U.S. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 789 F.2d 497 (7th Cir. 1986).
130
Supra note 72.
131
42 U.S.C. § 9606.
132
42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(1); BENDER, supra note 27
, § 4A.02(1)(c)(V).
133
Tull, 481 U.S. at 422-23.
129
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(the penalties) and one that courts view as equitable (cost recovery).134 The court must
grant a jury trial in such an event because it cannot refuse such a request when legal and
135

equitable actions intermingle.

The Seventh Amendment analysis applies to cost-recovery and contribution
actions, but the nuances of CERCLA sections 107 and 113 present somewhat different
results. Section 107 is considered to be antecedent to section 113.136 Because of this
connection, courts have often applied the section 107 Seventh Amendment analysis and
then concluded that the section 113 action also fails because of the antecedent “equitable”
claim.137 Many of the courts that denied the right to trial by jury simply performed the
mechanics of the Seventh Amendment analysis, but they failed to correctly conclude no
action at common law is analogous to these modern section 113 contribution actions.138
The court in Hatco v. W.R. Grace & Co.139 performed an extensive, in-depth analysis of
the eighteenth-century English courts’ treatment of “contribution” actions.140 However,
the court accepts the term “contribution” without considering the ramifications.
No analog to modern contribution actions exist because the common law courts
rejected the doctrine of contribution among joint tortfeasors. Dean Prosser said “the
common law rule [was] that there can be no contribution among those who are regarded
as ‘joint tortfeasors.’”141 The rule against contribution reigned for over one-hundred years
where, during that time, only nine American jurisdictions contradicted the rule without

134

Supra text accompanying note 128.
Tull, 481 U.S. at 417-418 and supra text accompanying notes 89 & 90.
136
American Cyanamid Company, 814 F.Supp. 209 (D.R.I. 1993); Smith, supra note 15.
137
American Cyanamid Company, 814 F.Supp. at 213-214 (1993).
138
Hatco, 859 F.Supp. at 773; American Cyanamid Co., 814 F.Supp at 214; United States v. Shaner, 23
Envtl. L. Rep. 20236 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
139
Hatco, 59 F.3d 400.
140
Hatco, 59 F.3d at 412-414.
141
PROSSER, supra note 36,§ 50.
135
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legislation.142 This rule prevailed until the 1970s when legislatures began accepting the
143

“cogent criticism” against disallowing contribution.

“The great majority of our courts

proceeded to apply [the rule] generally.”144 With no state legislation enacted that allowed
contribution in the eighteenth century, the general rule against contribution controlled.145
Therefore, contribution actions essentially did not exist at common law and lack any
common law analog.
One court has recognized a right to trial by jury in CERCLA contribution actions.
The Federal District court in United States v. Shaner146 held the right to trial by jury does
exist because contribution actions are legal in nature.

147

Even though the court did not

perform an extensive application of the Seventh Amendment analysis, it did perform an
important part: examining whether the remedy sounds in law or equity.148 The court said:
[I]t is plain that the obligation of a joint tort-feasor to contribute arises out
of the tort and the fact that one seeking contribution has paid more than his
fair and just share. The word ‘equitable’ as mentioned in the decisions
does not mean a matter for chancery. It does not mean ‘equity’ as opposed
to ‘law.’ It is founded upon natural justice, and when words ‘equitable’ or
‘equity’ are used, reference is made to an attempt to do right and to deal
fairly between the parties. Nonetheless, it is a legal right enforced in
actions at law where the parties have a right to a jury trial.149
The Shaner court also looked to Palmer v. United States150 in support of its conclusion
where the Ninth Circuit held that “[r]ecovery of damages is a remedy traditionally
granted by common law courts”; therefore the right to trial by jury attaches because

142

Id.
Id.
144
Id.; Union Stock Yards Co. v. Chicago Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co., 196 U.S. 217 (1905).
145
Id.
146
23 Envtl. L. Rep. at 20236.
147
Id. at 3.
148
Id.
149
Id. (emphasis supplied.)
150
652 F.2d 893, 895-896 (9th Cir. 1981), overruled on other grounds, White v. McGinnis, 903 F.2d 699
(9th Cir. 1990).
143
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contribution actions sound in law.151 Contribution actions more closely resemble natural
resource recovery actions than cost-recovery actions, and other courts have indicated the
152

Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury attaches to CERCLA contribution actions.

As a procedural matter, some plaintiffs bring CERCLA sections 107 and 113
actions in tandem.153 When plaintiffs pursue such a cause of action, the right to trial by
jury attaches because courts have recognized either cost-recovery actions or contribution
actions are legal in nature and bringing both equitable and legal actions does not waive
the right to trial by jury.154
Thus far, the issue has been further refined: whether eighteenth-century analogs to
cost-recovery and contribution actions sound in courts of law or courts of equity. By
examining the U.S. history of environmental law, CERCLA statutes, congressional
record, and the application of the Seventh Amendment analysis, eighteenth-century
history of English courts holds the key to the answer. The Court has declared on
numerous occasions this continues to be the polestar in the Seventh Amendment
analysis.155 Lower courts have held that the eighteenth-century analogs sound in equity,
but did the court choose the proper analog? Did the analog action offer an identical or
similar remedy?

II. ENGLAND
CERCLA Section 107 and 113 Counterparts
151
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England has a proud history of environmental regulation, since it was one of the
first countries to develop laws regulating the environment.156

With the Industrial

Revolution157 producing mass amounts of pollution affecting England’s towns and
countrysides, the British faced the reality of environmental destruction.158 The “dark
satanic mills” dotting the landscape throughout Britain spewed plumes of soot and
smoke, the evil side of the glorious Industrial Revolution where society worshipped
innovation at its own expense.159 The death rate in 1875 equaled the highest rate in
England in its previous forty years while infant mortality remained at incredibly high
levels.

160

Thankfully the cries of humanity opposing the exchange of the health of a great

nation for the Almighty Pound awakened the consciences of the politicians.161 With
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SIMON BALL & STUART BELL, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: THE LAW AND POLICY RELATING TO THE
PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT 9 (3rd ed. 1991).
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THE NEW ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, vol. 6, 304-305 (15th ed. 1997). The Revolution brought
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machine and industrial. Id. From 1769 until 1830 the Revolution remained, for the most part, in England.
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BALL & BELL, supra note 156, at 9.
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DAVID HUGHES, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 3-8 ((2nd ed. 1992). One of the harshest critics of the Industrial
Revolution was Charles Dickens, the most popular literary figure of his time. DANIELLE DUBAS, foreward
pg. viii in CHARLES DICKENS (Dorset Press, N.Y. 1994). Dickens grew up during the height of the
Industrial Revolution in England as he was born in 1812 in Portsea, England and died 58 years later in
1870:
From the stagecoaches in The Pickwick Papers to the belching smokestacks of Coketown
in Hard Times, industry is forever on the rise throughout [Dickens’] books. The sign of
industrialism – smokestacks, furnaces, locomotives – are always ominously connected
with disillusionment, failure, even death. But the characters who are the most intensely
steeped in this new industrialism either see the light, like Scrooge in A Christmas Carol
and Gradgrind in Hard Times, or are defeated and demolished in true villain fashion, for
Dickens was a moralist.
Id.
160
HUGHES, supra note 159, at 3.
161
Id.
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public health problems increasing, Parliament responded by enacting the Public Health
Act of 1875, a “landmark” act.162
Historians also credit Britain with establishing the world’s first “national public
pollution control agency” when Parliament enacted the Alkali Act of 1863 that, in turn,
created the Alkali Inspectorate, an agency created to control “atmospheric emissions
primarily from the caustic soda industry.”163 The enactment of the Public Health Act and
the Alkali Act does not encompass all of English environmental law because English
environmental law, like the United States, does not limit itself to statutory cause of
actions; common law actions also exist to remedy environmental destruction.164 This
discussion will begin by looking to the origins of the English environmental law and
observe the progress through the years ultimately discovering the CERCLA sections 107
and 113 counterpart(s).
Laws regulating the public environment date back to the beginning of English
common law under the writ of trespass. An action of trespass would lie if a “man’s body,
goods or land have been unlawfully touched.”165 The writ of trespass – “the most general
term that there is”166 – separates into two separate types of actions: felonies to be
prosecuted and lesser trespasses where a felony is not pleaded.167 Actions under the writ
of trespass originally concerned mostly criminal matters, but civil claims did exist.168
Blackstone also recognized the action of trespass when a person damaged the “herbage”
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BALL & BELL, supra note 156, at 9. The 1875 Act brought much needed uniformity to the regulation of
public health in general providing a model governmental authorities would use in planning towns and
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or spoiled the corn of a neighbor.169 These actions allowed the plaintiff to recover
damages “however as the jury think proper to assess.”

170

The common law actions for

environmental harm do not limit themselves to trespass actions, but also include
nuisance.
The law eventually developed into nuisance where public nuisance became the
cause of action for harm committed by a “direct encroachment” of a public right or
171

property creating a common injury.

The use of nuisance law theory in environmental

harm cases is not a novel idea.172 One of the earliest cases involving nuisance, and
173

arguably the first environmental law case, is William Aldred’s Case.

Long before

Blackstone’s Commentaries were published from 1765-1769,174 the King’s Bench in 1611
heard William Aldred’s Case involving a plaintiff affected by the noxious odors of swine
on a neighbor’s property.175 The defendant pleaded not guilty arguing “one ought not to
have so delicate a nose, that he cannot bear the smell of hogs.”176 The King’s Bench
applied the law of nuisance holding the plaintiff should recover.177 The court reached its
holding by using an “environmental analogy”:178
And the building of a lime-kiln is good and profitable; but if it be built so
near a house, that when it burns the smoke thereof enters into the house, so
that none can dwell there, an action lies for it. So if a man has a
watercourse running in a ditch from the river to his house, for his
necessary use; if a glover sets up a lime-pit for calve skins and sheep skins
so near the said watercourse that the corruption of the lime-pit has

169
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corrupted it, for which cause his tenants leave the said house, an action on
the case lies for it . . . 179
The doctrine of sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedes (“one should use his own property in
such a manner as not to injure that of another”) was born.180 The English courts continued
to apply the doctrine at the time of Blackstone: “[T]he rule is, ‘sic utere tuo, ut alienum
non laedes’.”181 In describing nuisance, Blackstone also said, “As to nuisance to one’s
lands: if one erects a smelting house for lead so near the land of another, that the vapour
[sic] and smoke kills his corn and grass, and damages his cattle therein, this is held to be
a nuisance.”182 England continued applying the strict liability standard of the sic utere tuo
rule until the 1960s.183
This application of sic utere tuo continued into modern times. In the seminal
1868 case that resides in all modern torts casebooks, Rylands v. Fletcher,

184

the House of

Lords reaffirmed the classic sic utere tuo common law rule.185 However, in the 1960s, the
House of Lords began using the doctrine of foreseeability to weaken the rule.186
Nevertheless, the development of nuisance law created the means for private individuals
to seek redress for environmental harm.187 The remedies available include the costs of
clean-up essential to restore the property to its previous condition, or the difference
between the property value before the pollution and afterward.188
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Apart from the common law, England has also developed statutory law protecting
the environment.

The Public Health Act of 1875 began a new era in English

environmental law eventually producing numerous other acts designed to control
pollution.189 Parliament also passed the Rivers Pollution Prevention Act of 1876190 and the
Housing, Town Planning, etc. Act of 1909. These, however, were largely unenforceable
in practice and contained non-obligatory regulations vesting control in local authorities.191
Prior to these acts, the governmental agencies, set forth to enforce the laws during the
Victorian era, failed to operate efficiently as the division of their responsibilities
separated urban and rural authorities.192

The administrative agencies lacked the

cohesiveness and structure to effectively manage the responsibilities placed upon them by
the various statutory acts.193

Many of the legislative acts covered environmentally

conscious issues such as “nuisances, sewage and sanitation, vaccination, [and]
diseases,”194 but compliance with the regulations was merely “permissive and not
mandatory.”195
From these notions of public health came the more specific regulation of waste
relating to pollution of water, air and land as the courts responded to discharges of waste
that polluted the environment.196 English law may have been the first in many different
areas of environmental law, but they, like the proverbial hare in Aesop’s Fable “The Hare

Chancery. Id. This further supports the classification of restitution as having a dual nature as discussed in
supra text accompanying notes 121-125.
189
BALL & BELL, supra note 156, at 14.
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and the Tortoise,”197 rested on their accomplishments and did little in the form of
environmental law until the decades of the 1960s and the 1970s, when the United States
began its development of statutory environmental law plodding steadily ahead of
198

England.

The 1960s and 1970s brought the modern age of environmental law into England,
and England has rapidly changed ever since.199 The focus of the modern environmental
laws in England is “on the control of pollution, and the growing concern . . . [of]
hazardous substances and processes, [and the] minimization and management of
waste.”200 The change of national focus vaulted environmental policy into a prominent
place in English public policy.201
The current path of English environmental law is turning more towards
preventing harm and consolidation of regulation.202 Parliament passed the Environmental
Protection Act of 1990203 which became one of the predominant environmental statutes in
England.204 The 1990 Act promotes integration of pollution controls – considered the
most important feature of the Act.205 The 1990 Act also, among other things, “empowers
the Secretary of State for the Environment to set statutory emission limits, restricting the
concentration of any substance that may be released by a prescribed process, and enables
him to establish quality objectives and standards for any environmental medium.”206 The
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1990 Act does provide the Secretary of State to recovery costs though the scheme is quite
different from CERCLA section 107.207 The costs recovered generally related to the
regulation of companies.208 Each new applicant must pay an initial fee when it seeks
authorization for its processes; this enables the Secretary of State to recover their costs
incurred in regulation.209 England did not end its environmental regulation here since it
followed the Act of 1990 with the Environment Act of 1995.210
Section 57 of the Environment Act of 1995 correlates with CERCLA sections 107
and 113.211 In short, the 1995 Act, and related guidance (“the 1995 Act”), authorizes the

1974 relating to waste on land with modifications as respects the functions of the
regulatory and other authorities concerned in the collection and disposal of waste and to
make further provision in relation to such waste; to restate the law defining statutory
nuisances and improve the summary procedures for dealing with them, to provide for the
termination of the existing controls over offensive trades or businesses and to provide for
the extension of the Clean Air Acts to prescribed gases; to amend the law relating to litter
and make further provision imposing or conferring powers to impose duties to keep
public places clear of litter and clean; to make provision conferring powers in relation to
trolleys abandoned on land in the open air; to amend the Radioactive Substances Act
1960; to make provision for the control of genetically modified organisms; to make
provision for the abolition of the Nature Conservancy Council and for the creation of
councils to replace it and discharge the functions of that Council and, as respects Wales,
of the Countryside Commission; to make further provision for the control of the
importation, exportation, use, supply or storage of prescribed substances and articles and
the importation or exportation of prescribed descriptions of waste; to confer powers to
obtain information about potentially hazardous substances; to amend the law relating to
the control of hazardous substances on, over or under land; to amend section 107(6) of
the Water Act 1989 and sections 31(7)(a), 31A(c)(i) and 32(7)(a) of the Control of
Pollution Act 1974; to amend the provisions of the Food and Environment Protection Act
1985 as regards the dumping of waste at sea; to make further provision as respects the
prevention of oil pollution from ships; to make provision for and in connection with the
identification and control of dogs; to confer powers to control the burning of crop
residues; to make provision in relation to financial or other assistance for purposes
connected with the environment; to make provision as respects superannuation of
employees of the Groundwork Foundation and for remunerating the chairman of the
Inland Waterways Amenity Advisory Council; and for purposes connected with those
purposes.
Environmental Protection Act 1990, Ch. 43, Long Title (Eng.).
207
Id. at 26.
208
Id.
209
Id. The Secretary of State must authorize the processes of the company or else the operation of such
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Environment Agency (“EA”) to seek reimbursement from the responsible parties and
order the clean up of the contaminated land.212 The 1995 Act also sets out statutory duties
of property owners or occupiers to clean up the contaminated site.213 Even though the
origin of the contamination may go unknown, the 1995 Act imposes liability upon the
current owner or occupier.214
The 1995 Act also defines the term “contaminated land” to assist governmental
agencies in deciding whether the pollution qualifies as an environmental risk.215 Local
agencies must determine if a “significant possibility of significant harm” exists creating
terms of art left for interpretation by the statutory guidance.216 However, the 1995 Act
gave agencies a decision matrix to use in analyzing the harm.217 The pollution must have
a source, “‘a receptor’ (a target which can be harmed) and ‘a pathway’ (a means of
exposing the target to the pollutant).”218 Without this “pollution linkage,” the land is not
contaminated.219
Once the agency classifies the land as contaminated, the remediation process may
begin. The local authority will issue a remediation notice to the targeted appropriate

to those bodies and for the conferring of other functions on them; to make provision with
respect to contaminated land and abandoned mines; to make further provision in relation
to National Parks; to make further provision for the control of pollution, the conservation
of natural resources and the conservation or enhancement of the environment; to make
provision for imposing obligations on certain persons in respect of certain products or
materials; to make provision in relation to fisheries; to make provision for certain
enactments to bind the Crown; to make provision with respect to the application of
certain enactments in relation to the Isles of Scilly; and for connected purposes.
Environment Act 1995, Ch. 25, Long Title (Eng.) (emphasis supplied).
212
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entities or persons responsible for the contaminated land if the appropriate entities do not
report the contamination first.220 The remediation notice lays out the procedures so the
appropriate persons properly clean up the contaminated land.221 Failure to comply with
the remediation notice can result in penalties and fines, and the agency can take the
appropriate persons to the High Court to enforce the remediation notice.222 Also, the local
authority may even clean up the contaminated land if the responsible person failed to
comply, or if the contamination creates an “imminent danger,” and then recover the costs
of the remediation.223 The EA is equipped to perform the cleanup itself and then seek
224

“reasonable costs” from the responsible parties with some limitation.

This is almost

identical to CERCLA section 107.
The 1995 Act also provides for contribution between liable parties.

The

remediation process may take several years to finish, and even then the site may require
continued observation.225 Obviously, this process can drive up costs.226 The 1995 Act
provides for holding more than one party responsible for the remediation costs.227 The
1995 Act gives local authorities guidelines in determining whether parties are liable and
to what extent.228 The local authorities may group parties according to their liability and
may exclude certain parties if they satisfy one of six tests given by the 1995 Act.229 The
remaining Class A parties must then bear the costs of remediation to the exclusion of
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Class B parties.230 The guidelines also allow apportionment within a class creating a
231

contribution regime.

The local authorities must apply three factors in determining

“relative contributions”: (1) “quantities of pollutant present”; (2) “different time periods
of occupation”; or (3) “the areas of the site occupied by the parties in the liability
group.”232 The authorities may also require different class members to contribute.233 This
element of the 1995 Act correlates strongly with CERCLA section 113 since both allow
contribution actions.234
It is clear that the Environment Act of 1995 is a counterpart to CERCLA sections
107 and 113.

Both provide bases for cost-recovery and contribution actions for

contaminated land clean-up costs. England’s legislation came twenty-five years after the
U.S. Congress enacted CERCLA, but both countries now have statutory actions almost
identical in these specific regards.

Now the next issue to discuss is whether the

substantive similarities transfer into the procedural by looking at England’s use of jury
trials in its environmental actions.

English Origins of Trial by Jury in Environmental Actions

To understand whether an environmental cost-recovery or contribution action
under U.S. law sounds in law or equity as required under the proper Seventh Amendment
235

analysis,

one must examine the types of actions in English courts at the end of the

eighteenth century, since it is eighteenth century actions the Court will look to in finding
a proper analog. Furthermore, the historical analysis of the courts reveals the differences
230
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between environmental law predecessors and restitution actions.

Historical

understanding not only benefits the analysis of the U.S. doctrine, but it also provides a
foundation to realize the path England has chosen in substantially limiting its storied jury
system.236 This discussion will continue to follow the English jury system past the
eighteenth century through its precipitous decline into the present.
At common law when the United States ratified the Constitution, the English
court system consisted of four different types of courts: the Court of the King’s Bench,
the Court of Common Pleas, the Court of Exchequer, and the Court of Chancery.237 The
first three courts recognized the right to trial by jury while the Court of Chancery,
developed from King’s grant to a chancellor to fashion different types of equitable relief,
238

did not.
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The King’s Bench possessed criminal jurisdiction and jurisdiction over inferior
courts including civil suits.239 The King’s Bench was prohibited by the Magna Carta from
hearing common pleas.240 Since the King’s Bench occupied itself with mainly criminal
cases, trespass actions, appeals of felonies, and suits to correct errors made by lower
courts (including the Court of Common Pleas), the caseload was quite small compared to
Common Pleas.241
The Court of Common Pleas determined civil suits between two subjects,242 and
this jurisdiction was general.243

These differed from the King’s Bench because in

common pleas the king had no interest.

244

William Holdsworth,245 the great English law

historian, divided the jurisdiction of the Common Pleas into four areas: (1) real actions
where fines and recoveries are sought, (2) correction of errors of the local courts,246 (3)
issue prerogative writs (i.e. writs for habeas corpus), and (4) jurisdiction over its own
officials.247 It is within the Court of Common Pleas that actions from the writ of trespass,
and its progeny nuisance, were brought.248 Furthermore, the right to trial by jury attached
because it was a court of law.249
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The Exchequer of Pleas tried cases concerning revenue matters and eventually
civil suits.250 During the late thirteenth century, the Exchequer heard common pleas, but
Parliament soon limited this by legislative enactments.251

The jurisdiction of the

Exchequer during the fourteenth, fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries was limited to
actions “by or against Exchequer personnel, sheriffs, and a few other officers who were
bound to render accounts at the Exchequer.”252
Though the jurisdictions appeared rigid, by the eighteenth century, the three
courts of the King’s Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer of Pleas overlapped
substantially.253 The King’s Bench continued to focus on appellate work, but the three
courts were considered “equal in status and authority and function.”254
Recognizing that remedies at common law in the King’s Bench, Common Pleas,
or Exchequer often failed to satisfy conscientious notions of justice, England developed
the doctrine of equity.255 The requirement of a right to trial by jury under a writ became
more cumbersome as England developed economically and the expansion of writs did not
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match the pace of the expansion of individual rights.256 This is where the chancellor’s
257

duties filled a void.

The Court of Chancery granted the equitable relief fashioned in

many different ways,258 and the Chancery granted such relief only if the courts of law
provided no remedy or the remedy was inadequate.259 The Chancery mostly occupied
itself with issues of “fraud, accident, and breach of confidence,”260 but the court
distributed the greatest amount of equity in the area of trusts.261
The distinction between law and equity is quite simple: courts of law awarded
money damages after an event occurred whereas courts of equity granted relief before an
event to prevent harm or wrongdoing.262 Since the only remedy at common law was
damages,263 the injured party often found this remedy inadequate in the case of
nuisance.264 If the injury was the result of an ongoing activity, damages would not cause
the harmful acts to cease.265 The Court of Chancery would issue an injunction prohibiting
the defendant from committing the actions that were the source of harm.266 For instance,
if the nuisance action for damages in a court of law was successful, the problem may
have not been solved as the defendant may continue interfering with the plaintiff’s
267

property rights.

Therefore, damages, or the remedy at law, would be inadequate and an

injunctive remedy available in Chancery, in addition to legal remedies, would suffice.268
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It is clear that eighteenth-century trespass and nuisance actions sounded in courts
of law where trial by jury was guaranteed.269 Both nuisance theory and the jury trial find
their origins in the actions of Henry II.270 Seeking to centralize the laws of England,
Henry II created the assize of nuisance which provided a remedy for landowners who
sought relief from “‘things erected, made, or done’ on the defendant’s land.”271 While it
originally sounded in criminal writ, since it was a branch of the writ of trespass,272
arguable dicta in a 1535 case expanded the theory to personal actions.273 The element
which distinguished trespass from nuisance was where the defendant performed the act.274
If the act was performed on the plaintiff’s land, then trespass was the action; dissimilarly,
if the act occurred on the defendant’s land, but hurt the plaintiff, then an action for
nuisance would lie.275 Nevertheless, juries in the courts at common law still determined
damages for the actions in trespass and nuisance.276
The decline in the use of trial by jury in England is legendary and welldocumented.277 Ironically, the deterioration of the jury system in England began its steep
descent just as statutory environmental actions began passing through Parliament.278 The
criticism of the jury system began as a relatively innocent academic exercise that sparked
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a fiery inferno engulfing the jury trial as was known by Blackstone, Coke, Glanville, and
other jurists of old.279
A statute in 1854 appeared to make a minor change in the fact finding system of
English courts, but this change began the erosion of trial by jury.280 The act was the
Common Law Procedure Act of 1854 which generally enabled judges to try facts without
the help of a jury.281 However, towards the end of the nineteenth century, the confidence
placed in the jury system surprisingly was increasing.282 As a matter of fact, England had
extended the right to trial by jury in divorce cases and probate cases with fifty percent of
the divorce cases decided by a jury of peers.283 Even the United States did not decide
divorce cases by a jury.284 England further expanded the use of jury trials to minor civil
suits tried in county courts, but this would be the height of its use.285 The 1854 Act began
to take its toll, for by the end of the nineteenth century juries tried only fifty percent of
the civil trials whereas before the number was eighty or well-over ninety percent.286
Within a matter of several decades, hundreds of years of expansion and development of
the jury system came crashing down.
The 1854 Act simply enabled parties to leave fact finding to a judge and
established that a decision by a judge would have the same impact as a jury verdict.

287

Moreover, the 1854 Act allowed parties to waive trial by jury in actions at Common Pleas
where previously the courts only conducted jury trials.288 This change appears innocuous,
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but practitioners and judges saw otherwise: “The very existence of an option made the
decision to ask for a jury suspicious.”289 Such a decision placed counsel in a position to
either offend the judges or choose a less desirable method of justice.290
The next hole in the bulwark of liberty was bored in 1883.

In that year,

Parliament limited the types of cases where trial by jury was a matter of course.291
Parliament recognized six types of civil cases where the right to trial by jury attached:
libel, slander, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, seduction, and breach of
promise of marriage.292 This act restricting the use of juries was a “war measure.”293
During this time, jury trials were available in other actions, but it required specific
requests making jury trials the exception instead of the general rule.294 This rule became
ever more restrictive when England implemented time limits for jury trial requests.295
This 1883 act was lifted in 1925, but new legislation continued the decline of jury trials.296
In 1933, Parliament enacted the Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act that
virtually eliminated the jury trial.297 The Act took away any absolute right to a trial by
jury, but allows juries in actions for fraud, libel, slander, malicious prosecution, false
imprisonment, seduction, or breach of promise of marriage effectively adding one action
298

to the 1883 act.

The 1933 Act also granted courts the power to order a jury trial. 299
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However, courts have interpreted this power to apply only in exceptional cases.300 This
newest act continued the assault and brought the number of jury trials in civil actions
down to about twelve percent in 1935.

301

Eventually, the number tumbled to around two

or three percent in 1988.302
This English trend in the use of juries clearly affected trial by jury in
environmental actions because courts of law hearing nuisance and trespass claims granted
trial by jury during the eighteenth century before the decline began in the later half of the
nineteenth century.303 Furthermore, the seven actions with qualified rights to trial by jury
do not include any actions for environmental harm.

304

Both the United States and

England have overwhelmingly denied the right to trial by jury, but the United States has
not had the broad retreat of the jury system found in English law.305

Yet another

distinguishing fact about British law is how they have denied the right: England enacted
statutes whereas the United States’ denial comes from lower-level judicial rulings.306 This
contrast in jurisprudence stirs well-founded questions concerning the underlying policy
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issue: what will be the outcome if the right to trial by jury in cost-recovery and
contribution actions is granted?

III. IMPLICATIONS OF RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY

If a right to a jury trial in cost-recovery and contribution actions exists, such a
right will alter litigation strategies.307 As a procedural matter, many judges (and parties
for that matter) waive the right to trial by jury because many consider environmental
cases so complex that juries would be inadequate decision makers.308 Furthermore, with
the increase of jury awards in civil litigation, the thought of a multi-million dollar verdict
strikes fear into the heart of every defendant’s counsel. Yet both of these concerns are
either unfounded or the disadvantages could easily be mitigated.
The main thrust of the argument contending the jury’s abilities in a complex civil
case stems from the third factor of analysis for jury trials stated in Ross v. Bernhard: “the
practical abilities and limitations of juries.”309 When courts consider the factors of length
of trial, number of parties involved, number of issues involved, magnitude of the
evidence, the complexity of the conceptual nature of the issue, and esoteric issues, they
have found that a jury, even though the issues are firmly planted in law, could not issue a
rational verdict because they could not understand the evidence, and could not make
conclusions of law in an area completely foreign.
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However, the judicial process could

easily remedy these potential problems by implementing a few minor changes.
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Faced with a jury trial in a complex litigation case such as a CERCLA action,
judges may choose from a number of mechanisms to assist juries without sacrificing
efficiency.

311

In distilling the issues down to the main points upon which the entire case

turns, judges can encourage stipulations of facts, host pre-trial conferences to eliminate
much of the procedural hurdles, and eliminate testimony irrelevant to the narrowed
issues.312 Likewise, in breaking the conceptual aspects of complex litigation into palpable
sections, judges may use various tools such as appointing a special master under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 53 who may summarize the expert witness testimony stating it in
terms the average jury member could understand.313 In addition to the special master,
judges themselves could alleviate the difficulty by mediating between the jurors and
counsel when misunderstanding arises and drafting succinct but helpful jury
instructions.314 These are just a few steps the judiciary can take in ensuring due process
during a jury trial of environmental cost-recovery or contribution actions.
The judiciary may prevent the second problem of excessive jury verdicts in a
number of ways. First, constitutional limitations placed on jury verdicts through the
judge’s discretion under remittitur eliminate much of the concerns surrounding excessive
jury verdicts.

315

Second, if the defendant’s oppose the judgment, they can seek a

judgment n.o.v., new trial, or appeal the decision.316 These avenues of justice ensure due
process on both sides of the lawsuit while preserving the right to trial by jury.
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IV. CONCLUSION

The right to trial by jury is the last remaining vehicle of true democracy preserved
in the Seventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. U.S. citizens embrace their Seventh
Amendment right and any denial of that right should undergo intense examination to
ensure such a right was never intended by the framers of the Bill of Rights. A proper
historical analysis of cost-recovery and contribution actions under CERCLA provides
overwhelming proof that the Seventh Amendment protects the right to trial by jury in the
discussed CERCLA actions.
When the current decisions by the federal courts denying the right to a jury are
properly analyzed, the correct conclusion becomes apparent. Court should not analogize
CERCLA actions to restitution actions because they are different in nature; nuisance or
trespass claims are the proper analogs. Moreover, the Court has classified restitution as
having both legal and equitable qualities. Ultimately, under the Tull two- prong analysis,
the eighteenth century analogs in English courts determine the outcome. English history
offers tremendous guidance on this part.
English environmental law, as in the United States, grew out of actions in
nuisance and trespass, but England’s history is much deeper. Courts applied the law of
nuisance – an ancestor to modern environmental law – as early as 1611. While the theory
of law changed, the courts did not, for both nuisance and trespass actions seeking
damages were heard in courts of law where the right to a jury attached. The continuity
between the English and American systems continued, to a certain extent, from the
eighteenth century until late in the nineteenth century when the jury system in England
began eroding.
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The decline of the English trial by jury reversed hundreds of years of legal
thought and ultimately denies the right to jury in environmental actions.

This

development over the past 150 years stands in stark contrast to the United States.
Thankfully the United States did not follow England’s example.
It is in defense of this “bulwark”317 and fear of its demise that courts should
properly analyze the rights under the Seventh Amendment in CERCLA cost-recovery and
contribution actions. Many advantages to the trial by jury exist and courts can implement
procedural tools minimize the disadvantages. CERCLA offers a remedy at law, and
under the Seventh Amendment, a jury of peers should determine the outcome.
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